Bill Edwards is a retired U.S. Army Colonel, a veteran of the Iraq War, a sUAS security trainer, and Owner of Phoenix 6 Consulting LLC.
The Tower 22 attack is one example of where the U.S. Army cites that commanders failed to “visualize risk and envision vulnerability.”
The modern battlefield demands a conscious and forward-leaning approach to the threat of unmanned aerial systems, but holistically, this should include all robotics in the aerial, terrestrial, aquatic and space domains. The zero line, a reference to the frontline in Ukraine, is flooded with drones of all types. This conflict, ensnared in trench warfare, is reminiscent of the battlefields of Europe in World War I, where the machine gun and tank notably became revolutions in military affairs; the small drone is this generation’s change to modern warfare.
All too often, the answer in this scenario is to move directly toward a material solution, a technical purchase, but this is a failed thought process. Buying hardware and software technologies before assessing the environment, planning, developing policies and procedures, and setting conditions for operational execution and concept of operations (CONOP) development is putting the “cart before the horse.”
The evolution of this technology and its effects on combat operations require that it be specifically addressed when organizing units for operational missions and the execution of tasks at all levels of war, specifically tasks related to offensive and defensive planning. In fact, according to a report from RAND, “Battalion and BCT staff require training and decision aids in airspace and risk management to accommodate more SUAS in the airspace while still employing rotary and fixed-wing aviation, fires, and other capabilities across warfighting functions.”
A different report from RAND urges the Army to move beyond basic operator training and prepare leaders and staff to use and counter drones in combined arms operations. It also calls for shared tactics and more realistic training with enemy drones, noting that “Most BCTs are inadequately trained or not trained at all on almost all collective unit sUAS and C-UAS tasks.”
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) And The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)
Let’s start with these traditional frameworks. Have legacy planning processes like the Army’s Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) adjusted to the realities of rapid technology development? In both frameworks, mission analysis and problem framing move directly into the course-of-action analysis and wargaming. It is here in these key steps that specific emerging technologies must be addressed to facilitate a greater understanding of the implications the tactical environment will have on operational and strategic end states; however, traditionally, this does not happen in these steps.
The playbook is often set or directed based on higher echelon planning and guidance, a concept of nesting two levels up. There must be a conscious decision to resist the “This is how we’ve always done it” type of thinking. Dismissing the lessons learned from recent conflicts shouldn’t be tolerated. The days of cementing key details in appendices and annexes buried deep in a lengthy operations order are over.
As an example, this leads to a greater understanding of signals and the integration of the communications expert into decision-making. It is time to address revolution in military affairs technologies upfront in the planning process and incorporate these low-density military occupational specialties into wargaming, testing the courses of action derived by staff planners based on a particular technological advancement. This is easily accomplished by simply detailing lessons learned from recent wars so that planners can address the implications. This then facilitates equipping and training at lower echelons. War and survival are always driving action/reaction solutions.
For example, comparing current U.S. tactics and training to the realities of Ukraine and Gaza would be a leap, although we are beginning to see pockets of excellence emerging in each service. But a holistic change to organization, training, tactics and operational execution is in the nascent stages. It should be noted that the Marine Corps is leaning forward by changing unit structures and setting up training to address the necessity for sUAS offensive and defensive capabilities at the small unit of action level. The concept of man, train, and equip is still developing as organizations understand changing battlefield requirements.
Based on the evolution of sUAS technology, leaders must think about this complex operating ecosystem with special emphasis on small drones. Maybe the recent decision for a $1 trillion defense budget will help our Services focus this effort holistically and build the unmanned system ecosystem thoughtfully. Now with the advent of optic fiber drones and their ability to defeat electronic warfare, the ever-evolving “cat and mouse” environments of war are showing that lasers can “run the cable line” back to their origin to target these seemingly untouchable drone attack units.
Furthermore, while understanding signal emissions is important, it didn’t carry the weight of priority in the past. Units must understand what they look like from this perspective as they consider defense for survivability.
In the end, it is a must for commanders and leaders to insist on diving into new technologies during the planning process that will have implications on plans, courses of action, end states and operational priorities. Commanders must insist that units conduct a drone vulnerability and risk assessment (DVRA) and spectrum analysis of the operating area and environment, build a drone emergency response plan and synchronize the staff, and begin development of Left of Drone Launch CONOP development to establish a proactive approach to counter unmanned systems tactics. This is an easily executed methodology, and these planning tools are a needed addition to the standard planning frameworks used by the Services.
Lastly, since units have traditionally not been under constant threat of an air domain attack, day-to-day business as usual for operations and logistics must change. The days of large forward operating bases with massive signal emissions are over. The sUAS (drone) technology and the war in Ukraine have proven that.
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